a very long period of inactivity, I here present an argument that, I
believe, demonstrates the untenability of the notion that a causative
actor—such as, for example, a creator deity—can be timeless while
still being causative.
To start, I will define two key terms:
"Bound by time" is defined as follows: "in the case of two or more things, when each one has a temporal location relative to the other(s)."
"A timeless being" is defined as follows: "a being that does not have a temporal location relative to anything."
Now, the argument:
1: Any two things [X] and [Y] that have a temporal relationship are
bound by time.
2: "Cause" and "effect" have a temporal relationship.
1: "Cause" and "effect" are bound by time.
3: A timeless being is not bound by time.
2: A timeless being is neither "cause" nor "effect."
this argument is, as I believe, sound, then a creator (causative) deity
that is ostensibly a timeless being is, in fact, a non-existing
manifestation of absurd reasoning.
Labels: First Cause, Kalam, syllogism, William Lane Craig